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Abstract
Why do some women in Muslim countries adopt fundamentalist Islamic value systems
that promote gender-based inequalities while others do not? This article considers the
economic determinants of fundamentalist beliefs in the Muslim world, as women look
either to marriage or employment to achieve ¯nancial security. Using cross-national
public opinion data from eighteen countries with signi¯cant Muslim populations, we
apply a latent class model to characterize respondents according to their views on gen-
der norms, political Islam, and personal religiosity. Among women, lack of economic
opportunity is a stronger predictor of fundamentalist belief systems than socioeconomic
class. Cross-nationally, fundamentalism among women is most prevalent in poor coun-
tries and those with a large male-female wage gap. These ¯ndings have important
implications for the promotion of women's rights, the rise of political Islam, and the
development of democracy in the Muslim world.
Acknowledgements: We thank Tim BÄ uthe, James Honaker, Jonathan Slapin, and George Tse-
belis for useful suggestions. Special thanks goes to Amaney Jamal for her extremely insightful
comments. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2006 Annual Meetings of the
Midwest Political Science Association and the 2006 Annual Meetings of the American Political
Science Association.Introduction
The resurgence of revivalist religious practices, or fundamentalism, in the late twentieth
century has been described as a \historical counterattack" mounted by threatened religious
traditions seeking to slow the spread of secularization and mitigate the perceived negative
e®ects of modern life (Almond et al. 2003, 20). Fundamentalist belief systems typically call
for a return to the \golden age" of some society or religion when, almost without excep-
tion, men enjoyed considerable social and economic power over women (Kaplan 1992). But
fundamentalist movements are not simply backward looking; rather, they possess a political
agenda that seeks to restore \lost social virtues" (Kuran 1993, 290) to contemporary society,
with speci¯c|and unequal|implications for the freedoms and advantages a®orded to men
and women.
Fundamentalist Islam has garnered particular outside interest in recent years in part
because of the unusually restrictive demands that it places upon women. In addition to beliefs
typical of fundamentalist ideologies that favor men over women in employment and education
opportunities, fundamentalist Islam further uses these beliefs as the basis for practices such as
veiling (use of hijab, `abayah, or niqab), female genital mutilation, and sometimes even honor
killings.1 Nevertheless, many Muslim women support and identify with the fundamentalist
Islamic social and political movements that promote these practices and beliefs, and often
willingly participate in these practices themselves. This article addresses the question of
why, in Muslim countries, women adopt fundamentalist value systems that limit their social,
political, and economic opportunities and, in the extreme, can even result in their physical
harm?2
Explaining why women in Muslim countries hold fundamentalist beliefs is necessarily a
complex and multifaceted issue. Our analysis focuses upon the economic and social incentives
women face when confronted with fundamentalist versus secular ideologies, but we recognize
that these are by no means the only|nor even, perhaps, the primary|determining factors.
Nonetheless, as we show empirically, economic pressures do have large and signi¯cant e®ects
on women's belief systems concerning religion, politics, and their own role and status in soci-
ety. Women with limited economic opportunities|whether due to unemployment, minimal
formal education, or poverty|are more likely to take on fundamentalist and traditionalist
belief systems that enhance their value as potential marriage partners.
We operationalize fundamentalism as a composite belief system that spans two broad
areas: preferences consistent with a traditionalist world view that systematically favors
men over women; and personal piety and support for the con°uence of politics and religion
consistent with conservative Islamic values.3 To ascertain the prevalence of such beliefs in
1The Islamic basis for these practices is a source of debate in the Muslim world. For example, the
performance of female genital mutilation is not supported by most interpretations of Islamic law but many
women in the Nile Valley associate this act with adherence to Islam.
2It is less confusing why Muslim men might support social practices that advantage them vis-µ a-vis women,
though this is also a research subject in need of further investigation.
3This de¯nition of fundamentalism may not conform with some popular or journalistic uses of the term.
We believe that our conceptualization is nonetheless valid and analytically useful. Debate over the status,
role, and rights of women in Islam is perhaps the most important line of cleavage between those individuals
who believe that the holy texts of Islam can be reinterpreted in the context of the present and those would
would be considered hard-line literalists; see also Winter (2001).
1the Muslim world, we examine public opinion data from the latest wave of the World Values
Survey, which included over 20,000 Muslim respondents in eighteen countries around the
world.
Researchers across the social sciences have described mass support for fundamentalism
as a vast sociopolitical movement, particularly among ¯rst-generation urban residents (Ka-
plan 1992, 9). While narrative discussions of this subject are widespread in the women's stud-
ies and anthropology literature on comparative fundamentalism, political scientists have only
paid scant attention to the topic. Yet understanding the determinants of fundamentalism
is highly relevant to understanding world politics, as increasing support for fundamentalism
in cultural practice has the potential to translate into increasing support for religiously-
oriented or authoritarian regimes and institutions (Fish 2002, Esposito 1999, Natchwey and
Tessler 1999). Understanding the economic determinants of fundamentalism in particular is
important because economic opportunity|unlike other more idiosyncratic factors that may
in°uence belief systems|can actually be shaped and regulated through government policy.
Fundamentalism and Gender Norms
Fundamentalism refers to any \sociopolitical movement that requires of its members a strict
adherence to speci¯ed `fundamentals' or doctrines; and that claims for its motivation in doing
so a divine, or otherwise transcendentally grounded, mandate" (Saha and Carr 2001, 3).
Anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and religious scholars have asserted that
fundamentalism and support for fundamentalist practices have enjoyed a resurgence in the
late twentieth century and that the motivation for the revival of neotraditionalism in diverse
cultures appears to be rooted in similar social, economic, and political processes (Brink and
Mencher 1997).
Islamic fundamentalist practices and beliefs vary from place to place but have at their
core a type of social conservatism that holds that Muslims must return to some authentically
`Islamic' tradition. The standard historical explanation for the rise of fundamentalism is that
in the wake of rapid modernization, secularization, and urbanization, the traditional rural
population became increasingly disconnected from their more religious past. `Fundamen-
talists' blamed economic hardships and setbacks on secular and liberal elements of society
(Marty and Appleby 1995, 1). With respect to gender norms, newly urbanized populations
found it di±cult to accept the changing role played by women that accompanied modern-
ization, particularly as women began to work in non-traditional areas.4 Fundamentalists
reacted negatively to women's social and economic liberation, particularly the changing na-
ture of male/female relations in urban settings (Kaplan 1992, 8).5 The resulting phenomenon
is what is generally described (to varying degrees) as Islamism, fundamentalism, Wahabism,
4Feminist scholarship suggests that during periods of rapid social change, gender assumes a paramount
position in social discourses since women in developing societies are seen as the main transmitters of so-
cial values. E®orts are are often made to reimpose traditional behaviors as a remedy for destabilization
(Moghadam 1993, 136).
5Mernissi (1987, ix) adds that fundamentalism can be seen as a \political statement about men undergoing
bewildering, compelling changes a®ecting their economic and sexual identity|changes so profound and
numerous that they trigger deep-seated, irrational fears."
2or puritanism, where traditional Islam (or what is perceived to be traditionally Islamic)
becomes elevated to a \sacrosanct status" (Esposito 1982).
Khaled Abou Fadl (2001, 7) argues that one of the most traumatic aspects of Islamic
puritanism has been its e®ect on women, as Muslim men seek to increase their feeling of em-
powerment in a modernizing world. He writes, \puritan movements appropriated women's
dignity into a symbol of honor for men" and that the easiest and most e®ective ways to
prove one's traditionalist legitimacy is to call for laws that are restrictive to women.6 Fun-
damentalists have increasingly focused their attention on issues of morality, particularly as
they pertain to the reputation and chastity of women (an issue closely related to a man's
status or honor). Hawley (1994) has argued that fundamentalists tend to be intimidated by
female autonomy and feel that exercising power over women remained one of the few areas
in which men could exert control and authority.
Support for the religious and cultural practices associated with controlling women, how-
ever, comes from both sexes. Why do women accede to these belief systems?
Economic Circumstances and Support for Fundamentalism
We contend that, among Muslim women, ¯nancial insecurity is a key determinant of the
propensity to adopt fundamentalist beliefs and preferences. To the extent that opportunities
for economic security via employment in the job market are limited, women may look to the
alternative of a favorable marriage in what is known as the \marriage market". For women,
fundamentalist views that perpetuate patriarchy and are associated with conservatism, reli-
giosity, and piety, are traits valued in the marriage market and society, writ large. Economic
pressure can, in this manner, create incentives that actually encourage women to support
preferences that disadvantage her in the market for education and employment so that she
may seek material security through marriage.
Muslim women have a choice of whether or not to adopt and identify with fundamentalist
belief systems|that is, their orientation towards or away from fundamentalism is not prede-
termined or externally imposed. Helen Hardacre|a contributor to the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences' ¯ve-volume `Fundamentalism Project'|writes that women \freely
and knowingly decide to relinquish power and autonomy in favor of men" (1993). Mah-
mood (2005) similarly emphasizes that Muslim women are active agents in the rise of funda-
mentalist values rather than victims of \false consciousness," and Brink and Mencher (1997)
note that women often choose fundamentalism to seek advantage or bene¯t. Adherence to
fundamentalist values is not an immutable or inborn trait. This is true even if we believe that
women do not choose these beliefs explicitly strategically, but rather take them on through
a process of imitating other women around them who seem economically successful.
Alternate explanations for fundamentalism among women
A wide variety of explanations have been proposed for why some Muslim women adopt fun-
damentalist belief systems (or various components of such belief systems), while others do
6Conservatives often cite Surat al-Nisa of the Koran which says \Men shall take full care of women with
the counties which God has bestowed more abundantly on the former than on the latter" as a justi¯cation
for their attitudes and actions toward women.
3not. Hardacre (1993) has identi¯ed a number of possible economic and cultural reasons,
including (1) fear of dislocation, often associated with anti-colonialist sentiment, (2) inabil-
ity to earn su±cient wages independent of a male breadwinner, (3) lack of education and
exposure to outside contacts, (4) concern over male reprisal for non-conformity and disobedi-
ence, (5) fear of divine disapproval, and (6) di±culty making choices about things that they
were raised to believe would be inevitable. Other treatments of this subject have tended to
emphasize the cultural and political aspects of the rise of fundamentalism (Mernissi 1987,
Piscatori 1994).
Recent e®orts by political scientists have focused more broadly upon the institutional
and economic bases for gender di®erences in support for patriarchal political norms and
conservative political policies. Iverson and Rosenbluth (2005) contend that the acceptance
of patriarchal norms is tied to patterns in the sexual division of labor, with societies based
on labor-intensive agriculture (or other modes of production that emphasize male \brawn")
tending to advantage men over women. This is consistent with the ¯ndings of Edlund and
Pande (2002) and Edlund, Haider, and Pande (2005) who demonstrate that the economic
insecurity associated with higher divorce rates leads women in advanced democracies to
support left-leaning politicians.
The theory and evidence that we present here reinforce interest in the economic determi-
nants of the beliefs and ideological orientation of women in the Muslim world. But it should
be kept in mind that for the most part, these alternate explanations are complimentary
rather than competing. Evidence in support of an economic motivation for some|or even
many|women to hold fundamentalist beliefs does not necessarily preclude other women
from holding fundamentalist beliefs for completely non-economic reasons.
Does poverty cause fundamentalism?
It has long been held that poverty breeds fundamentalist beliefs and that poor Muslims
have been the demographic group most a®ected by this phenomenon. Relative deprivation
and hopelessness are cited as sources of frustration for many Muslims, particularly young
men. Shimon Peres, in his vision of \the new Middle East," argued that fundamentalism is a
protest against poverty.7 Others have made the case that poverty provides fertile ground for
fundamentalist belief systems (Kepel 1985; Zuhur 1992). The causal mechanism is thought to
be that poor economic circumstances \may create attitudes and grievances among particular
groups in the population, inclining them favorably to fundamentalist arguments, themes, and
practices" (Almond et al. 2003, 130).
This claim is oft-repeated, yet signi¯cant counter-examples stand out. Citizens of cash-
starved Bangladesh enjoy a reputation for their secular outlook while oil-rich Saudis are
much more likely to be considered fundamentalist in their outlook toward religion. Economic
booms do not inoculate against rising fundamentalism nor do busts ensure the opposite. And
although standards of living have continued to rise across the Muslim world during the 20th
century, support for fundamentalism has also increased.
In addition, research into fundamentalist self-identi¯cation at the individual level has
shown it to cut across socioeconomic lines. Mahmood (2005, 2) writes that during her
7Interview with Middle East Quarterly, March 1995, 2(1).
4¯eldwork studying the Islamist movement in Egypt, \women from a variety of socioeconomic
backgrounds" supported Islamism, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that Islamist
support came only from among the poor. Moghadam (1993) also stresses that fundamentalist
preferences are not a function of class among women. Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin
Ibrahim (1980) has shown that Islamic extremists tend to be well-educated, upwardly-mobile
young men, not the stereotypical slum dweller. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood across
the Islamic world are very often doctors, lawyers, and engineers. It is not clear, however,
if individual extremists or fundamentalist group leaders that are subject to academic study
are representative of the broader distribution of individuals with these beliefs.8 Most current
knowledge about support for fundamentalism also deals speci¯cally with the preferences and
beliefs of Muslim men, while Muslim women may face a very di®erent set of constraints and
incentives when choosing among belief systems.
Economic opportunity and ¯nancial security
Considering the potential °aws in a poverty-based economic explanation for fundamentalism,
we propose a second mechanism through which ¯nancial insecurity may lead women to
embrace fundamentalist beliefs.
The basic avenues to material security for women in the Muslim world are gainful em-
ployment, marriage to a gainfully employed spouse, or some combination of the two.9 When
economic opportunities are available and market conditions favorable, women seek employ-
ment opportunities outside of the home (Hoodfar 1997, 20). Under less favorable economic
circumstances, however, marriage can serve as an economic substitute for paid employment
in the workforce.
For women, identifying with fundamentalist belief systems has value in the marriage
market. Marriage in Muslim-majority countries, particularly among the non-elite, is viewed
as a contract between two parties and is likely to be the single most important economic
arrangement that a woman enters into in her entire life (Hoodfar 1997). Selection of mar-
riage partners is therefore a critical concern. One observer of Egyptian family life writes
that potential partners need to have the right set of quali¯cations; and women particularly
must re°ect well upon the public reputation of the families involved since Muslim males
are preoccupied with \family name and reputation" (Rugh 1985, 108-9). Among the most
highly valued traits in a potential bride are piety and traditionalism. Moral conservatism
and modest, religious behavior are considered important qualities at all levels of society|
from female inhabitants of Cairo's cemetery-slums known as the City of the Dead (Watson
1992), to middle- and upper-class Egyptian women.10 Indeed, young men in Cairo's urban
quarters see the search for a \moral" marriage partner as a more daunting challenge than
8For example, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita (2005) makes the compelling case that there exists a wide
distribution of individuals in extremist groups, yet those selected for study may be the individuals of highest
\quality" with regard to education and ability.
9In the wealthiest of the Gulf oil states, it is possible to live o® of state largess and family wealth though
the vast majority of women are married, employed, or both.
10This observation is based on conversations with dozens of Egyptian women during nine-months of ¯eld
research conducted in 2005 by Author; see also Zuhur (2003) and Singerman (1995).
5¯nding an apartment in the city's highly competitive market for a®ordable real estate (Ismail
2006, 110), suggesting that there is a premium of sorts for a pious bride.
The contemporary Muslim view is that family is the fundamental unit of society and
the mother has a key role in the socialization of children, particularly in raising committed
Muslims and transmitting cultural values (Moghadam 1993, 100). A woman's status, there-
fore, is mainly determined by her ability to be a good wife and mother (Rashad et al. 2005).
Anthropologists report that fundamentalist women, in general, are dedicated to the \mainte-
nance and valorization of patriarchal social structures" and believe that the moral formation
of children against the in°uence of secular society is a mother's most important task (Al-
mond et al. 2003, 11-12). Adherence to conservative values, therefore, tends to increase a
woman's marriageability.11
At the same time, the ability of women to obtain certain well-paying positions is also
contingent upon their preferences|except in precisely the opposite manner. External signals
of piety that might help women in the marriage market may actually hurt them in the market
for many desirable jobs. Barsoum (2002) writes that higher education is not a su±cient
condition to get a good job in Egypt; employers also serve as gatekeepers weeding out those
individuals who do not ¯t the progressive attitudes for sought-after multinational company
positions.12 For example, veiled women in Egypt have been subject to job discrimination in
prestigious ¯elds such as televised media, advertising, hospitality, and other segments of the
tourism market (El Sirgany 2006) and foreign companies often have an unwritten policy of
not hiring veiled women (Hatem 1992).
Women in many Muslim-majority countries therefore face a double bind. On the one
hand, those that provide secular signals to actors in the employment market are disadvan-
taged in the market for marriage. But those that provide conservative signals to potential
spouses in the marriage market may be disadvantaging themselves in the market for high-
paying jobs.13 Women|particularly those without good job prospects|su®er from high
levels of anxiety as a result of economic uncertainty and may view marriage as the only
source of ¯nancial security (Bourqia 1995). This has led some to claim that women's con-
servatism and adherence to puritanical Islam has a material basis. Hoodfar (1997, 135)
comments that, \Women's adherence to traditional ideology serves their interests, given
their possibilities and justi¯es ¯nancial dependence on their husbands."
It has been noted that, just as women in higher socioeconomic classes may hold fundamen-
talist beliefs, some of the strongest support for the Islamist movement is among extremely
well-educated women, such as doctors and university educators, who may see the opportunity
for prestigious employment opportunities by providing high-level services to other women in
11Male preferences on this issue are highlighted in the following statement made to an anthropologist:
\The fact is that men who have reservations about (female) circumcision would marry circumcised women,
but those who see circumcision as necessary for women would not marry uncircumcised women" (quoted in
Hoodfar 1997, 261; Hoodfar's usage of the term \female circumcision" is a euphemism for the practice more
commonly known as female genital mutilation.). Similarly, conservative preferences are seen as a necessary
trait for many marriages and an acceptable trait for the rest. In her study of Cairo's popular (i.e. non-elite)
neighborhoods, Ismail (2006, 111) ¯nds that both educated and uneducated men share conservative views
regarding gender relations.
12While many conservative women are able to seek employment in the state sector, these jobs are generally
much less desirable and lucrative than private sector employment.
13See Patel (2005) for a thorough discussion of signaling piety.
6single-sex environments (Moghadam 1993, 148) or for serving in a leadership capacity for the
mass Islamist movement. This is also consistent with the observation that the highest levels
of society of some Arab countries have seen an increasing polarization of beliefs between
hardcore secularists and extreme traditionalists (El Sayed 2007). Thus it is possible that
even though the overall trend is for the prevalence of fundamentalist beliefs to decrease with
education, this trend will reverse slightly for women at the very highest levels of education.
We in fact ¯nd evidence of this e®ect in our analysis, below. An alternate possibility is that
employed and highly-educated women who are interested in marriage adopt conservative
beliefs to o®set the secular signal sent by those sources of self-su±ciency. But if this were
true, then we would ¯nd no e®ect of employment or education on belief system, which is not
what our empirical results indicate.
Identifying Belief System Patterns
To determine precisely how economic factors in°uence the degree to which Muslim women
adopt fundamentalist belief systems, we analyze cross-national public opinion data collected
over the past decade as part of the World Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart et al. 2004).14
Survey data and sample selection
Our study spans the eighteen WVS countries with the largest Muslim populations, represent-
ing nearly seventy percent of the world's Muslims.15 No country excluded from our analysis
contains more than two percent of the world's Muslim population. We restrict our analysis
to only those individuals who identify themselves to the WVS as Muslim. This produces a
data set containing a very large total of 22,376 individual respondents.
Fundamentalist Islamic belief systems are, by de¯nition, multifaceted. To characterize
fundamentalists, we identify sixteen questions asked by the World Values Survey addressing
preferences towards gender roles and opportunities, as well as personal religiosity and the role
of religion in government. Responses to these questions act as indicators of each individual's
underlying belief system|which may or may not be fundamentalist. These questions, listed
in Appendix B, are not based on the experience of a particular country, but rather are of
relevance across the Islamic world. Most questions are also extremely speci¯c, and leave
little room for outside interpretation or cultural bias.16
Notions of gender equality are typically associated with industrialized, Western nations,
but these ideas are increasingly becoming globalized. While some individuals believe in
equality between the sexes, others favor traditionalist ideals, often transmitted via religious
channels, and associated with the people who claim the right to speak in the name of
puritanical Islam. Questions such as whether men should have more of a right than women
14The World Values Survey is accessible via the Internet at www.worldvaluessurvey.org. For more on
the design and scope of other cross-national public opinion studies, see Heath, Fisher, and Smith (2005).
Survey research based upon the principle of random sampling is widely recognized as an e®ective and reliable
scienti¯c instrument for the collection of opinion data in political science (Brady 2000).
15A complete list of these countries, and the sample sizes for each, are given in Appendix A. We exclude
WVS countries with fewer than 150 Muslim respondents to ensure that each country has a su±cient sample
size to be able to make meaningful estimates of country-level fundamentalism at a later point in the analysis.
16On this issue, see King et al. (2004).
7to a job or a university education, whether women must have children, or whether polygamy
is acceptable, capture this division well.
Questions about personal religious practices such as frequency of attendance at religious
services and belief in God measure another component of fundamentalism, as do questions
related to support for the con°uence of religion and politics. Fundamentalist Islamic groups,
like the Muslim Brotherhood, have long argued that Islamic law be implemented by gov-
ernments of many Muslim countries. While recently some of these groups have shifted their
argument to encourage laws in an Islamic \framework," the intent is clear|a joining of
religion and state. The World Values Survey asks, for example, whether respondents believe
that politicians must believe in God, whether religious leaders should in°uence politics, and
whether Islamic law should be implemented. As with opinions favoring traditionalist gender
roles, religiosity and political religiosity are necessary, but not su±cient, conditions for being
considered fundamentalist.17
Latent class analysis
Groups of individuals with similar belief systems provide roughly similar sets of survey
responses across our questions of interest. To assess the nature and degree of this clustering,
we employ a statistical technique called latent class analysis.18 The latent class model
utilizes information about the frequency with which di®erent patterns of survey responses
were given, and the similarities and di®erences between these response patterns, to partition
the survey sample into subgroups of like-minded individuals. It does so by assuming a
latent (unobserved) categorical variable that accounts for the observed relationships between
responses to the survey questions.19 In our analysis, this categorical variable represents
di®erent belief systems.
The latent class model identi¯es the natural groupings (the \classes") in the data and
estimates the most probable class membership for each respondent. However, the model does
not determine the actual number of such latent groups, though it can guide the analyst in
making a theoretically and empirically sound assessment. In ¯tting the latent class model,
our goal is to estimate the simplest model that isolates and identi¯es those individuals with
a `fundamentalist' belief system. As we demonstrate in the next section, a model with four
latent classes accomplishes this task well.
The latent class model also allows for the inclusion of individual-level covariates|such
as social class, education level, and employment status|to predict latent class membership
(Dayton and Macready 1988; Bandeen-Roche et al. 1997). The covariates represent a second
source of information in addition to the survey responses about each individual's ideological
orientation. In this latent class \regression" model, the probability of membership in each
17To be clear, while this article deals with belief systems in Islamic societies, we make no claims regarding
whether certain beliefs are aspects of a `right' or `true' Islam.
18The technique of latent class analysis was ¯rst set forth by Lazarsfeld (1950). A wide range of variations
and extensions of that original model have subsequently been developed (Hagenaars and McCutcheon 2002).
19Latent class models require no assumptions about respondents assigning utility to their responses, nor
about any sort of utility maximization when selecting among outcomes. This contrasts with the statistical
methods of ideal point estimation, which are also used to estimate latent characteristics of individuals based
upon their observed behaviors, but which do require certain rationality assumptions. See, for example,
Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004).
8latent class is predicted by the e®ects of the covariates, and in turn, explains the observed
pattern of responses across the sequence of questions of interest.
Model setup and estimation
In order to 1) cluster survey respondents and 2) estimate the e®ects of covariates on that
clustering, the latent class model assumes that the survey population is made up of a mixture
of di®erent types of people, with di®erent probabilities of giving each response to each
survey question, depending upon their underlying beliefs. These underlying types, however,
are unobserved, and must be inferred from the observed responses and covariates. The
model does this by probabilistically categorizing respondents such that conditional on the
unobserved latent variable|that is, the variable that labels the belief system clusters|
individuals' survey responses are statistically independent.
In statistical terms, let i = 1:::N index survey respondents, and Xi be a vector of
covariates for the ith respondent. Assume the unobserved latent variable is a discrete variable
with R unordered categories. Because the categories of this variable are exhaustive, the
probabilities that an individual belongs to each of the R categories must sum to one. We
therefore employ a multinomial logit link function to map from Xi to each of these R prior
probabilities:
pr(Xi;¯) =
eXi¯r
PR
q=1 eXi¯q
: (1)
The coe±cient vectors ¯r are estimated in the model, with ¯1 = 0 (corresponding to an
arbitrarily selected \reference" class) ¯xed by de¯nition. The sign and magnitude of the
coe±cients in each ¯r determine the relative probability that a respondent will belong to
class r with respect to class 1.
The model simultaneously estimates the probabilities that, conditional upon belonging
to each class, an individual will give each response to each question. Denote these class-
conditional response probabilities as ¼jkr, where j = 1:::J indexes questions and each
question has k = 1:::Kj discrete outcomes. The probability of observing individual i's
response pattern if they belong to class r is
f(Yi;¼r) =
J Y
j=1
Kj Y
k=1
(¼jkr)
Yijk; (2)
where Yijk represents the observed survey responses. Yijk = 1 if respondent i gives the kth
response to the jth question, and Yijk = 0 otherwise. Examining these values after the model
has been ¯t provides a pro¯le of the \type" of respondent in each latent class.20
20If any survey item does a poor job of \discriminating" between the latent classes|either because the
classes do not di®erentiate on that item, or because the item does not contain that much variation to begin
with|it will be apparent in the estimated values of ¼jkr. Using survey questions with low variance does not
impede the estimation or interpretation of the latent class model in any way.
9Given observed Xi and Yi, we estimate the parameters ¯r and ¼jkr by maximum likeli-
hood.21 The log-likelihood function of the latent class regression model is
lnL =
N X
i=1
ln
R X
r=1
pr(Xi;¯)f(Yi;¼r): (3)
The estimated ^ ¼jkr and ^ ¯r can then be used to ¯nd the posterior probabilities (again,
summing to one) that individuals belong to each class. Because the ^ ¼jkr are estimates of
question response probabilities conditional on class r, we apply Bayes' formula to calculate
c Pr(rjXi;Yi) =
pr(Xi; ^ ¯)f(Yi; ^ ¼r)
PR
q=1 pq(Xi; ^ ¯)f(Yi; ^ ¼q)
: (4)
These posterior probabilities utilize all information|both covariates and survey responses|
known about each person in the survey.
Finally, taking the average value of the posteriors c Pr(rjXi;Yi) across all survey respon-
dents provides an estimate of the share of the survey sample in each latent class.
Individual-level Analysis
We apply the latent class model to the selected WVS items for all Muslim respondents in the
eighteen countries under analysis. In pooling respondents across countries, we are explicitly
imposing a standard of fundamentalism that is universal.
Model selection and results
A latent class model with four classes provides an accurate and useful ¯t to the observed data.
Two classes produce an overly crude partition along liberal-conservative lines. Adding a third
class distinguishes the secular grouping more clearly, but leads to a poor classi¯cation of
conservatives. The four-class model accomplishes our objective of isolating a fundamentalist
subgroup, which consists of roughly 33 percent of the survey sample.22 It also estimates that
approximately 13 percent can be considered secular.23 When a ¯fth class is added to the
21To ¯t the model, we utilize the statistical package poLCA (Linzer and Lewis 2007), implemented in R
version 2.5.0 (R Development Core Team 2007).
22Note that while the survey sample is random within each country, the pooled sample is not a random
sample of Muslims worldwide. Countries such as India and Indonesia are under-sampled, while others such
as Azerbaijan, Jordan, and Turkey are over-sampled. Thus, the fact that a third of the sample belongs to
the `fundamentalist' class does not necessarily imply that a third of the world Muslim population would also
belong to that class. We address this issue in greater detail below.
23It is possible that the secular group is so small because of the choice of countries surveyed. It is also
possible that Muslim respondents who hold secular beliefs are not identifying themselves as Muslims on the
survey. To investigate this possibility, we ¯t a four-class model to the 2,541 respondents who report no
religious a±liation. A subgroup of 22 percent comprise a secular class similar to what was found among self-
identi¯ed Muslims; a further 20 percent are still more secular. Even if all of these respondents were actually
Muslim, that would only be 1,070 individuals|less than ¯ve percent of the total number of self-identi¯ed
Muslims in the sample.
10Muslim Women Muslim Men
Fund. Trad. Relig. Fund. Trad. Relig.
Constant 2.804 2.202 1.456 4.538 2.783 1.685
(0.224) (0.231) (0.217) (0.230) (0.246) (0.274)
Unemployed 0.811 0.629 0.623 -0.527 -0.526 -0.685
(0.102) (0.102) (0.089) (0.102) (0.114) (0.144)
Education (low to high) -1.302 -0.639 -0.401 -1.233 -0.701 -0.815
(0.096) (0.099) (0.087) (0.090) (0.098) (0.108)
Education2 0.108 0.029 0.029 0.098 0.045 0.069
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Class (low to high) 0.081 0.050 0.186 -0.086 0.028 0.200
(0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.042) (0.047) (0.054)
Latent class population shares
Fundamentalist 0.332 (0.005)
Traditional 0.259 (0.005)
Religious 0.278 (0.006)
Secular-Liberal 0.131 (0.003)
Observations 19749
Parameters 270
Residual d.f. 19479
Log-likelihood -231238
Table 1: Results from latent class regression analysis with four classes and sixteen survey
questions. Coe±cients ^ ¯r are multinomial logits calculated with respect to the secular-liberal
class. Standard errors are in parentheses. The four sets of class-conditional response proba-
bilities ^ ¼r appear in Appendix B.
model, almost none of the individuals identi¯ed as fundamentalist in the four-class model
are re-classi¯ed, indicating that the four-class model is the most parsimonious.
To test the theory that women who have the ability to earn a reasonable income outside of
marriage will be less likely to support fundamentalist values, we include a series of covariates
in the latent class model. The main test variable is the self-reported employment status of the
individual respondent. We also conduct an indirect test by controlling for the respondent's
level of education, as, in general, greater amounts of education are expected to provide
greater potential employment opportunities, and hence greater income potential and more
Western attitudes towards women's role in society. To give the model su±cient °exibility to
capture a possible upward trend back toward fundamentalism at the very highest levels of
education, we also include a squared term for education.
Including a covariate measuring the respondent's social class allows us to test the e®ect
of poverty. While in general, we expect that women who self-identify as being members of a
lower social class will be more fundamentalist than women of a higher social class, some part
of this e®ect will be attributable to respondents in lower social classes typically having less
11education. Our hypothesis is that the e®ects of employment and education will be stronger
predictors of belief systems than social class, once all three variables are included in the
model.
When ¯tting the latent class model, we employ interaction terms between sex and each of
the other covariates, to re°ect our expectation that the e®ect of these covariates is di®erent
for men and women.24 Estimates of the coe±cients on these covariates are given in Table 1.25
For ease of interpretation, we report the estimated e®ects for men and women separately,
rather than the coe±cients on the interaction terms. Because respondents with missing
observations on the dependent variables can be included when estimating the latent class
model, it is possible to estimate the model across the entire eighteen-country sample for all
sixteen dependent variables, even though the full battery of questions was not asked in every
country.26 Results from additional models controlling for respondents' age are not reported,
as that variable turns out to have nearly zero e®ect on predicting latent class membership.
Subgroup characteristics
The four groupings identi¯ed by the latent class model provide considerable insight into the
belief systems of Muslims worldwide (see Appendix B). The primary division is between
a class we term `secular-liberal' and the other three classes. Individuals in the `secular-
liberal' class tend to both eschew traditional notions of gender roles and exhibit generally
lower levels of religiosity. They pray relatively infrequently, object strongly to the veil, and
oppose the implementation of Islamic law. Unlike those in the conservative subgroups, these
individuals are divided on questions of whether having children is necessary for a woman
and if, when jobs are scarce, men should be advantaged over women. While many of these
individuals would not be described as completely `secular' or `liberal' by Western standards,
they represent the secular-liberal trend in the Islamic world.
At the other end of the spectrum, the `fundamentalist' grouping combines traditionalist
gender norms with high levels of personal and political religiosity. Individuals in this category
believe overwhelmingly that women should be religious, veiled, obey their husbands, and
must have children. They take comfort in religion, believe that religion and God are very
important in their lives, and think politicians must believe in God as well. They also favor
implementing Islamic law, and believe that men make better political leaders than women.
The two intermediate subgroups are both more traditional and religious than the `secular'
subgroup, yet they di®er from the `fundamentalists' in speci¯c ways. The ¯rst of these classes
consists of individuals who are similar to the `fundamentalists' on issues of traditional gender
roles, but are not as religious as the `fundamentalists', nor believe that religion should be
as involved in politics. We term this cluster of individuals the `traditional' class. The
other intermediate class, in contrast, consists of individuals who are very much religious
24The covariates are WVS items X001, X025, X028, and X045. Education and self-reported social class fall
into ordered categories with eight and ¯ve responses, respectively. Employment status is a nominal variable
with eight categories; we recode the variable as 1 if the individual is unemployed or a housewife, 0 otherwise.
25We do not include country dummy variables among the covariates, as doing so would imply that respon-
dents who gave the same survey responses and had the same covariates, but resided in di®erent countries,
would have di®erent probabilities of belonging to each latent belief system cluster. This would imply that
`fundamentalism' had di®erent meanings in di®erent countries; an operationalization we wish to avoid.
26For how the latent class model accommodates missing values, see Linzer and Lewis (2007).
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Figure 1: Predicted prior probabilities that unemployed Muslim women in a low social class
fall into each of four belief system clusters, using results in Table 1.
and supportive of religious practices such as veiling and the implementation of Islamic law.
However, this group is nearly indistinguishable from the `secular-liberal' class on issues of
traditional gender roles, including opportunities for employment and education, whether
men make better political leaders, whether wives must obey their husbands, and whether
polygamy is acceptable. We term this ¯nal cluster of individuals the `religious' class.
Explaining belief systems
The e®ects of sex, education, social class, and employment status jointly predict the proba-
bility with which an individual is likely to belong to each of the four belief system groups.
For women, with the exception of the e®ect of social class, which does not signi¯cantly
di®erentiate between the `secular-liberal' and `fundamentalist' and `traditional' classes, all
of the e®ects are highly statistically signi¯cant in the expected direction. To interpret the
substantive e®ect of these variables on the latent class membership of Muslim women, we
calculate predicted prior probabilities for hypothetical values of the covariates using Eq. 1.
Increased education has a dramatic e®ect on reducing the propensity of women to possess
a fundamentalist belief system (Figure 1). At the lowest levels of education, almost no women
fall in the `secular-liberal' grouping, while approximately seventy percent are either `funda-
mentalist' or `traditional'. The probability that a woman will belong to the `traditional'
class declines at each subsequently higher education level. The fallo® in the probability of
belonging to the `fundamentalist' class is even more precipitous at ¯rst, reaching a mini-
mum once a woman has achieved around a university preparatory level of education, and
then increasing slightly for highly educated women. At the minimum, however, for women,
achieving a secondary school education reduces by more than half the probability of falling in
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Figure 2: The e®ect of employment on Muslim women's predicted prior probabilities of being
in each of four belief system clusters. Results are for university-educated women in a low
social class.
the fundamentalist group, compared to having only an elementary level (or less) of formal ed-
ucation. Note that as women become more educated, their support for traditionalist notions
of gender roles decreases, but they may still retain a strong sense of religiosity. Decreasing
probabilities of belonging to the `fundamentalist' or `traditional' groups at higher levels of
education are o®set by increasing probabilities of belonging to either the `secular-liberal' or
`religious' groups.
An economic explanation for the e®ect of education is that having at least a high school
education creates opportunities for women to gain employment in the formal rather than
informal or agricultural sectors where wages are low and often only serve to supplement a pri-
mary income. A possible alternate explanation is that education lowers women's propensity
to hold fundamentalist beliefs because the education system is itself secular and encourages
that type of thinking. We therefore re-estimate the model only for respondents in Iran, a
country where women receive explicitly Islamic education. The estimated e®ect of education
on fundamentalism and secularism in Iran follows the same pattern as in Figure 1, except
without the increase in fundamentalism at the highest education levels.27
Muslim women who are not employed are roughly ¯ve percent more likely to possess
`fundamentalist' belief systems than those who work, regardless of education level and social
class (Figure 2). Employment has similar e®ects on the `religious' class for women with
higher levels of education. As a result, women who work, are students, or are retired are far
more likely to belong to the secular-liberal class|by as much as 12 percent for women with
some university-level education.
The e®ect of social class in this model is small, and subtle. Even though the coe±cients
on social class for women in Table 1 are positive, being in a high social class actually reduces
by a small amount the probability that a woman will be fundamentalist. This is because
27Unfortunately, other countries such as Afghanistan under the Taliban, and Sudan (since 1989) that also
promote fundamentalist Islamic religious education were not in the WVS.
14high-class women are both less `fundamentalist' and less `secular' (and, for that matter,
less `traditional') than low-class women; instead they are much more likely to belong to the
religious class.
Overall, poorly educated, unemployed, low-social class Muslim women are the most likely
to hold fundamentalist beliefs.
One of the potentially most important aspects of these ¯ndings are related to the pref-
erences and values of female university graduates|likely leaders of any nascent feminist
movement in the Muslim world. Azza Karam (1998) proposes that there exist three types of
feminists in the Islamic world: secular feminists, Islamist feminists, and Muslim feminists.
Secular feminists support Western norms of gender equality and are represented in our data
by the `secular-liberal' class that we describe. Islamist feminists argue that Islam promotes
a patriarchal structure but that patriarchy is not necessarily oppressive for women,28 and
tend to refer to religious texts for support of their agenda.29 This group is perhaps best
represented in the data by the uptick in support for fundamentalism that is apparent among
highly educated women.30 Muslim feminists, on the other hand, are women who hold a
strong personal religious conviction and promote a reinterpretation of Islamic texts in ways
that promote equality between the sexes. The key di®erence between Muslim feminists and
Islamist feminists, therefore, is that Muslim feminists are willing to contextualize religious
injunctions in order to allow for the possibility of textual reinterpretation (Karam 1998, 12).
Our ¯ndings indicate that as women become more educated, they shed some of their prior
support for gender inequity in favor of a combination of personal religiosity and a worldview
of gender equality. Well-educated women who fall into the `religious' class that we describe
map most closely onto this analytic category of Muslim feminist. Among those women who
are likely to be feminist leaders of Islamic world in the future|those with at least a uni-
versity education|religious feminists clearly outnumber both Islamist feminists and secular
feminists.
Finally, it is worth noting that the e®ects of employment, education, and social class
operate somewhat di®erently on the belief systems of Muslim men. The main di®erence
between men and women is that men are considerably more likely than women to belong to
the `fundamentalist' class|by as much as thirty percent for employed men in a low social
class. Also unlike women, men who are employed are more likely to hold fundamentalist
beliefs and less likely to hold secular-liberal beliefs. While men at all levels of education
are more likely to be `fundamentalist' than `secular', greater education does increase the
prevalence of secular belief systems among men.
28Islamist feminists have their roots in the activism of Zeinab al-Ghazali|founder of the Muslim Women's
Association and a±liate of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
29Moghadam (2002) questions whether Islamic feminism, as characterized by Karam (1998), even exists
or if this term is an oxymoron.
30The emergence of a small but in°uential class of highly educated, fundamentalist women is an important
area of future research. Since their fundamentalist orientation is not likely due to poor job prospects (Hessini
1994), other motivations, including but limited to, anti-authoritarian or anti-globalization sentiment should
be investigated.
15Cross-National Analysis
A measure of the value, to women, of participating in the labor force is the size of a country's
wage gap between male and female earnings. When the wage gap is large, women seeking
¯nancial security will have greater incentives to direct their e®orts away from the job market
and instead towards marriage. To test whether fundamentalist belief systems are indeed
more prevalent among women in countries with higher levels of male-female wage inequality,
we aggregate our individual-level results at the country level. This also reveals the geographic
distribution of social, religious, and political belief systems across the Muslim world.
Geographic patterns of Muslim belief systems
We assign each respondent to one of the four ideological groupings according to their modal
posterior latent class membership probability.31 We then tabulate out the proportion of each
country's overall, male, and female Muslim population in each group (Figure 3). Geographic
patterns are immediately apparent. Fundamentalist belief systems are most prevalent in
Middle Eastern and North and West African countries, and in particular the four Arab
countries in the sample: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria. Secularism, on the other
hand, is con¯ned nearly entirely to Southeastern Europe, India, and the former USSR.
Moreover, while each country's fundamentalist types are far more likely to be male, religious
types are far more likely to be female. There is little to no di®erence between the proportion
of men and women in the traditional and secular-liberal groups, from country to country.
We use this information to estimate the proportion of Muslims worldwide in each of
the four categories (Figure 4). As noted above, the Muslim countries in the WVS are not
randomly sampled. To account for this, we weight each country's sample size in proportion
to that country's true percentage of the global Muslim population (Appendix A). Worldwide,
approximately thirty percent of Muslims belong to each of the fundamentalist, religious, and
traditional belief system groups; the remaining ten percent fall into the secular-liberal group.
Once again, Muslim women are more likely to belong to the religious group, and Muslim
men are more likely to belong to the fundamentalist group.
Explaining cross-national variation
We model the country-level estimates of the prevalence of fundamentalism among women as
a linear function of each country's male-female wage gap. We also control for the e®ect of
wealth, as measured by per capita GDP. Because the proportion fundamentalist is bounded
by 0 and 1, we transform it by taking the log-odds before ¯tting the model.
The results of this regression are given in Table 2. Because the dependent variable is
estimated in a preliminary analysis, we report Efron small-sample robust standard errors.32
Wage gap data are drawn from the United Nations Human Development Report (2005, 2004,
2003, 2002, 1999) for the years in which the WVS was ¯elded in each of the study coun-
31This assignment rule minimizes the probability of misclassi¯cation; see Bishop (1995, ch. 1) and Duda
and Hart (1973).
32These standard error estimates account for heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable and are more
conservative than normal OLS standard error estimates (Lewis and Linzer 2005).
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: Estimated proportion of each country's Muslim population (²) that belongs to
each of four belief system groupings, as well as proportions of males (M) and females (F).
Countries in each ¯gure are sorted by overall population share.
tries.33 The wage gap in each country in each year is calculated as female estimated earned
income (PPP US$) divided by male estimated earned income. We obtain our measure of
33When data are missing, these data are taken from the closest available year. WVS study years are
Algeria 2002; Azerbaijan 1996 (missing, use 1997); Bangladesh 2002; Bosnia-Herzegovina 2001 (missing, use
2003); Egypt 2000; India 2001; Indonesia 2001; Iran 2000; Jordan 2001; Macedonia 2001 (missing, use 2002);
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Figure 4: Estimated proportion of male, female, and all Muslims worldwide in each belief
system subgroup.
Variable Coe±cient SE t p
Intercept 5.259 3.128 1.681 0.115
Wage gap -4.767 1.785 -2.670 0.018
Per capita GDP (log) -1.353 0.659 -2.052 0.059
Table 2: Linear regression model; dependent variable is estimated percent Muslim women
fundamentalist by country, log-odds transformed (Montenegro omitted for lack of data on
independent variables). N = 17; R2 = 0:396; ^ ¾ = 0:82. The two independent variables are
correlated at -0.405.
per capita GDP (PPP constant 2000 international $) from the World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators (2005) database, also for the years in which each country's WVS was
administered.
The e®ect of the male-female wage gap on a country's level of fundamentalism among
women is pronounced|indeed, on a percentage basis, the e®ect is nearly one-to-one at low
levels of wealth (Figure 5). Even with only 17 observations, and using robust standard error
estimates, the e®ect is signi¯cantly greater than zero. The wealth e®ect, while not as large
as the wage gap e®ect, is still substantial, and also achieves statistical signi¯cance. The
highest predicted level of fundamentalism among Muslim women is in countries that are the
poorest while at the same time having the greatest male-female wage gap.
These observational data alone can not rule out the possibility of endogeneity bias, to
the extent that fundamentalist ideas regarding gender norms cause wage inequality and poor
economic growth, rather than the reverse. Yet, although this alternate hypothesis may be
plausible in today's globalized economy where the ability to tap into female human capital
could attract investors, it is not at all clear to have been true when the Islamist movement
began developing broad popular support in the 1960s and 1970s and many societies held
similarly unequal attitudes toward gender roles. Consider, from a broader perspective, the
Montenegro 2001 (not available); Morocco 2001; Nigeria 2000; Pakistan 2001; Singapore 2002; Tanzania
2001; Turkey 2000; Uganda 2001.
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Figure 5: Predicted proportion of women, by country, who are fundamentalist at varying
levels of wage inequality and per capita GDP (Table 2). Individual countries are denoted by
circles, with vertical lines indicating the positioning of each; lines are dotted below the best-¯t
surface.
changing attitudes toward gender outside of the Islamic world over time. At the turn of the
twentieth century, norms of gender equality were just beginning to become internationalized
with most societies holding beliefs that systematically favored men over women. In fact,
Islam's favorable attitudes toward women's property rights may have even economically ad-
vantaged Muslim women versus women in other societies at that time. However, countries
such as those in the West whose economies o®ered women greater employment opportunities
were less likely to hold onto these norms of gender inequality over time. The Muslim world
was not particularly disadvantaged economically when it entered the twentieth century. But
Islamic inheritance laws and other economic and political institutions hindered growth (Ku-
ran 2004) and ultimately the Islamic world came to be known as more retrograde with regard
to internationalized gender equality norms than other parts of the world.
Conclusions and Implications
This study provides empirical evidence for a mechanism linking a lack of economic oppor-
tunity to support for fundamentalist belief systems among Muslim women worldwide. We
do not claim that economic considerations are the only relevant factors. Rather, we demon-
strate that among the many forces that may impel Muslim women to adopt a fundamentalist
value system, one signi¯cant one is the quest for ¯nancial security.
19Women with unfavorable economic prospects have more to gain on the marriage market
by adopting fundamentalist beliefs than they do on the employment market by adopting
secular|or even just non-traditionalist|beliefs. In particular, women without jobs, or with
lower levels of formal education have a greater tendency to view the world from a tradi-
tionalist or fundamentalist perspective. And countries that are poorer and provide fewer
economic opportunities for independent women contain more women (on a percentage basis)
that hold fundamentalist beliefs.
An important goal of this article has been to consider some of the economic motivations
of Muslim women in a strategic context.34 This approach is in stark contrast to the usual
treatment of the Islamic world, which some seem to believe is dominated by immutable
cultural, historical, and religious forces. Our intent has not been to target Islam as a religion
with particular gender practices, but instead to try to explain the variation in attitudes that
we observe across the Muslim world. We are interested in determining when Western norms
regarding gender are adopted and by whom.
What are the implications of these ¯ndings? Consider three broad areas. First, if we care
about women's rights in family protection, employment, and education in and of themselves
then these ¯ndings suggest that increasing economic opportunities for women in the Muslim
world will lead to a decrease in fundamentalism. Second, Natchwey and Tessler (1999) have
argued that support for political Islam tends to be associated with cultural factors, like
personal religiosity and attitudes toward gender equality. While Islamists in government are
still a relatively rare phenomenon, the recent victory of Hamas in Palestine and the electoral
successes of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Islamic parties in Turkey suggest that
political Islam is increasingly an important political phenomenon. Third, Fish (2002) posits
that the inferior status of women in Muslim countries accounts for at least part of the link
between Islam and authoritarianism. From a normative perspective, if gender attitudes are
a determinant of democratic capacity, then these ¯ndings shed light on the possibility for
the development of more democratic government in the Islamic world.
Finally, this study has shown that there exists tremendous variation in ideological beliefs
both within the Islamic world and among individual Muslims. This suggests that interpreta-
tions of Islam are mutable. While fundamentalist attitudes toward women are widespread,
being Muslim does not mean that one need adopt particular beliefs with regard to the sexes.
Binder (1988) has argued that there exists the potential for Islamic liberalism and this article
has suggested one way that this liberal tradition may be activated.
34The strategic basis for male support for fundamentalism is just beginning to be explored (e.g., Arce and
Sandler 2003) and provides another potentially fruitful research area.
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Countries in study, and total number of individuals interviewed in each country by the WVS,
tabulated by sex and Muslim religion. yRespondents in Algeria were not asked their religion.
zRespondents in Pakistan were asked their sectarian a±liation (Sunni or Shi'a) rather than
religion; with 97 percent of the Pakistani population Muslim, we assumed all respondents
were Muslim. ¤source: Wikipedia (2007).
Muslim Only
Percent Percent of Country share
WVS Muslim Muslim in respondents of world Muslim
Country Total Total Male Female country in sample population¤
Algeriay 1282 1282 650 632 1.000 0.057 0.021
Azerbaijan 2002 1821 893 928 0.910 0.081 0.005
Bangladesh 1499 1378 761 617 0.919 0.062 0.084
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1200 485 235 250 0.404 0.022 0.002
Egypt 3000 2830 1446 1384 0.943 0.126 0.047
India 2002 217 119 98 0.108 0.010 0.113
Indonesia 1000 929 467 462 0.929 0.042 0.139
Iran 2532 2457 1324 1133 0.970 0.110 0.043
Jordan 1223 1168 569 599 0.955 0.052 0.004
Macedonia 1055 266 155 111 0.252 0.012 <0.001
Montenegro 1055 221 109 112 0.209 0.010 <0.001
Morocco 2263 1012 496 516 0.447 0.045 0.021
Nigeria 2022 640 338 302 0.317 0.029 0.042
Pakistanz 2000 2000 1041 959 1.000 0.089 0.104
Singapore 1512 574 272 302 0.380 0.026 <0.001
Tanzania 1157 466 272 194 0.403 0.021 0.011
Turkey 4607 4460 2221 2239 0.968 0.199 0.045
Uganda 1002 170 94 76 0.170 0.008 0.003
Total 32413 22376 11462 10914 0.690 1.000 0.684
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Sixteen World Values Survey questions are used in this study. WVS item numbers are
given in brackets. Table contains overall percentage of respondents giving each answer, and
percentage tabulated by latent class, with cells containing estimated probabilities that a
member of each class gives each response (^ ¼jkr).
Secular-
Total Liberal Fund. Trad. Relig.
How important is religion in your
life? [A006]
Very impt. 0.814 0.204 0.945 0.846 0.903
Somewhat 0.142 0.497 0.048 0.146 0.095
Not very 0.035 0.239 0.004 0.008 0.002
Not at all 0.009 0.060 0.003 0.001 0.000
When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than
women. [C001]
Agree 0.673 0.449 0.899 0.736 0.466
Disagree 0.223 0.430 0.045 0.143 0.378
Neither 0.104 0.120 0.055 0.121 0.156
Do you think that a woman has to
have children in order to be ful¯lled
or is this not necessary? [D019]
Not necessary 0.198 0.407 0.113 0.142 0.212
Needs children 0.802 0.593 0.887 0.858 0.788
On the whole, men make better
political leaders than women do.
[D059]
Agree strongly 0.345 0.206 0.691 0.143 0.194
Agree 0.328 0.317 0.202 0.617 0.219
Disagree 0.235 0.324 0.078 0.226 0.384
Disagree strongly 0.092 0.153 0.029 0.013 0.203
A university education is more
important for a boy than for a girl.
[D060]
Agree strongly 0.147 0.094 0.329 0.053 0.043
Agree 0.173 0.134 0.193 0.296 0.053
Disagree 0.368 0.375 0.246 0.512 0.384
Disagree strongly 0.311 0.397 0.232 0.138 0.520
Is wearing a veil in public places an
important trait for a woman?
[D067]
Very impt. 0.491 0.035 0.710 0.288 0.525
Important 0.185 0.076 0.151 0.289 0.172
Somewhat 0.098 0.167 0.049 0.140 0.111
Not very 0.088 0.166 0.043 0.133 0.080
Not at all 0.139 0.556 0.048 0.150 0.112
Is being religious an important trait
for a woman? [D070]
Very impt. 0.773 0.074 0.937 0.678 0.865
Important 0.150 0.326 0.042 0.283 0.109
Somewhat 0.043 0.278 0.014 0.031 0.020
Not very 0.021 0.183 0.006 0.007 0.004
Not at all 0.014 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.002
To what extent do you agree or
disagree that it is acceptable for a
man to have more than one wife?
[D076]
Agree strongly 0.069 0.034 0.155 0.013 0.016
Agree 0.106 0.054 0.153 0.129 0.038
Neither 0.140 0.188 0.108 0.230 0.084
Disagree 0.449 0.583 0.427 0.504 0.396
Disagree strongly 0.237 0.140 0.157 0.124 0.466
22Secular-
Total Liberal Fund. Trad. Relig.
To what extent do you agree or
disagree that a wife must always
obey her husband? [D077]
Agree strongly 0.376 0.135 0.686 0.222 0.191
Agree 0.329 0.273 0.202 0.613 0.266
Neither 0.139 0.284 0.060 0.101 0.222
Disagree 0.114 0.251 0.041 0.059 0.210
Disagree strongly 0.043 0.057 0.011 0.005 0.112
How important is God in your life?
(ten point scale) [F063]
Not at all (0) - (9) 0.155 0.567 0.091 0.125 0.059
Very impt. (10) 0.845 0.433 0.909 0.875 0.941
Do you ¯nd that you get comfort
and strength from religion? [F064]
No 0.038 0.257 0.006 0.005 0.010
Yes 0.962 0.743 0.994 0.995 0.990
How often do you pray to God
outside of religious services? [F066]
Every day 0.566 0.177 0.614 0.568 0.628
Once a week/more 0.155 0.174 0.118 0.201 0.143
Once a week 0.080 0.114 0.073 0.086 0.062
Once a month/more 0.063 0.088 0.053 0.069 0.063
Several times/year 0.054 0.199 0.040 0.034 0.044
Less often 0.039 0.118 0.033 0.030 0.035
Never 0.044 0.129 0.069 0.013 0.025
Politicians who do not believe in
God are un¯t for public o±ce.
[F102]
Agree strongly 0.521 0.125 0.732 0.293 0.672
Agree 0.226 0.106 0.135 0.463 0.144
Neither 0.076 0.219 0.030 0.085 0.071
Disagree 0.115 0.318 0.056 0.141 0.063
Disagree strongly 0.062 0.232 0.046 0.018 0.050
Religious leaders should not
in°uence how people vote in
elections. [F103]
Agree strongly 0.317 0.441 0.399 0.067 0.403
Agree 0.381 0.351 0.249 0.631 0.300
Neither 0.116 0.090 0.095 0.170 0.116
Disagree 0.132 0.063 0.169 0.123 0.127
Disagree strongly 0.053 0.055 0.087 0.009 0.054
Religious leaders should not
in°uence government decisions.
[F105]
Agree strongly 0.290 0.443 0.399 0.032 0.412
Agree 0.399 0.333 0.235 0.682 0.238
Neither 0.137 0.131 0.139 0.158 0.149
Disagree 0.135 0.049 0.156 0.119 0.163
Disagree strongly 0.039 0.044 0.070 0.009 0.038
Which of these traits should a good
government have? It should
implement only the laws of the
shari'a. [F111]
Agree strongly 0.387 0.030 0.571 0.136 0.333
Agree 0.290 0.034 0.226 0.444 0.299
Neither 0.180 0.373 0.099 0.241 0.240
Disagree 0.091 0.379 0.064 0.128 0.075
Disagree strongly 0.052 0.184 0.040 0.052 0.054
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